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Note
The Right of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to Enrich Uranium
Kamyar Ghorbanebrahimi
I. INTRODUCTION
The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) has been negotiating its
nuclear program with the international community since 2002.1
As a sovereign state, Iran insists on having a peaceful nuclear
program.2 Iran calls it an “inalienable” right.3 The president of
Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated at a recent ceremony in Tehran
that “[n]ot only nuclear energy, but also nuclear technology and
even [uranium] enrichment are our inalienable rights . . . we
have every right to progress and development.”4
Certain members of the international community, including
the United States of America, are suspicious of Iran’s nuclear
program and its final destination.5 Iran is currently negotiating
its nuclear program and intention to enrich uranium with the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and
Germany (P5+1 countries).6 During these negotiations, the
United States has taken the stance that there is no inherent

Juris Doctor, University of Minnesota Law School, 2015. B.S., Shiraz
University, 2012.
1. See IAEA and Iran: Chronology of Key Events, IAEA, http://www.
iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-of-key-events (last visited Sept. 20,
2015).
2. See, e.g., Laura Smith-Spark, Iran, World Powers Start Final Nuclear
Talks Round Before Deadline, CNN (July 3, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2014/07/03/world/iran-nuclear-talks/.
3. Rouhani Reaffirms Iran’s Enrichment Right, PRESSTV (Dec. 7, 2013,
9:45AM), http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/12/07/338667/rouhani-reaffirmsiran-enrichment-right/.
4. Id. (second alteration in original).
5. See Iran Nuclear Crisis: Can Talks Succeed?, BBC, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11709428 (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
6. See Amir Paivar, Iran Nuclear Negotiations Go into Extra Time, BBC,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29220200 (last visited Oct. 4,
2015).
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right to enrich uranium for member states of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.7 As Under Secretary of
State Wendy Sherman stated in a Congressional hearing on
October 3, 2013:
It has always been the United States’ position—and I
have said to my Iranian interlocutors many times—is
that article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
does not speak about the right of enrichment at all; does
not speak to enrichment, period. It simply says that you
have the right to research and development, and many
countries, including countries like Japan and Germany,
have taken that to be a right. But the United States does
not take that position. We take the position that we look
at each one of these [cases]. And more to the point, the
UN Security Council resolution has suspended Iran’s
enrichment until they meet their international
obligations. They did not say they have suspended their
right to enrichment. They have suspended their
enrichment. So we do not believe there is an inherent
right by anyone to enrichment.8
The differing positions of states as members of the
international community leads to a clear question of public
international law—does a sovereign state that is a party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have the
right to enrich uranium?
This Note seeks to answer this question as applied to the
Islamic Republic of Iran. First, this Note will present an
introduction to the process of uranium enrichment. Then, it will
introduce the framework of relevant international law. Finally,
the analysis section of the Note will examine Iran’s right to
enrich uranium according to the current international law
regime.

7. See Reversing Iran’s Nuclear Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Rel., 113th Cong. 19 (2013) (statement of Wendy Sherman, Under Sec.
of State for Pol. Aff., Dep’t of State).
8. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. URANIUM ENRICHMENT
Uranium is a rather heavy,9 naturally occurring element.10
Natural uranium atoms come with different masses,11 and these
different types of uranium atoms are called uranium isotopes.12
Isotopes have similar chemical characteristics, but they differ in
their physical properties.13 Naturally occurring uranium
contains 99.3% of the slightly heavier uranium, called U238, and
around 0.7% of the slightly lighter uranium, U235.14
Uranium is a radioactive element,15 and the atoms of the
radioactive elements are also unstable.16 Uranium atoms
constantly and spontaneously decay through emission of subatomic particles or gamma rays.17 Since uranium is unstable, it
is a very good candidate to be broken down into lighter and more
stable atoms. This process is crucial for our purposes because it
can produce a massive amount of energy.18 Fission is the
scientific term of art that scientists use for this phenomenon.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines
fission as “[t]he splitting of an atom, which releases a
considerable amount of energy (usually in the form of heat) that
can be used to produce electricity.”19 This energy is used in power
plants to produce electricity and was also used in the atomic
bombs that the United States dropped on Hiroshima and

9. What is Uranium? How Does it Work?, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/What-isUranium--How-Does-it-Work-/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
10. See Uranium, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH, http://www.eoearth.org/view/
article/156796/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
11. See generally id. (explaining that uranium variations stem from the
number of neutrons in the nucleus).
12. See Isotope, ENCYCLOPEDIA EARTH (July 11, 2007, 9:11 PM), http://
www.eoearth.org/view/article/153924/.
13. Id.
14. Uranium, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Radioactive Element, FREE DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/radioactive+element (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
18. “The isotope U235 is important because under certain conditions it can
readily be split, yielding a lot of energy.” See Uranium, supra note 10.
19. Fission (Fissioning), NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fission-fissioning.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
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Nagasaki.20 In this way, the same energy that can be used to
produce electricity can also be used to cause a catastrophe.
The Commission states that “enriching uranium increases
the proportion of uranium atoms that can be “split” by fission.”21
As previously mentioned, U235 accounts for around 0.7% of the
uranium atoms in nature.22 Enrichment is the process that
increases the percentage of U235.23 Since different isotopes are
chemically similar, the only way to divide them—in the case of
separating U235 from U238—is by the difference of their
physical properties, mainly the difference in mass.24
Iran uses the gas centrifuge process to enrich uranium.25
Through this process, uranium in the form of uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) gas molecules is fed to interconnected
centrifuge machines.26 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
describes this technical and complicated procedure:
In this process, UF6 gas is placed in a cylinder and
rotated at a high speed. This rotation creates a strong
centrifugal force so that the heavier gas molecules
(containing U238) move toward the outside of the
cylinder and the lighter gas molecules (containing U235)
collect closer to the center. The stream that is slightly
enriched in U235 is withdrawn and fed into the next
higher stage, while the slightly depleted stream is
recycled back into the next lower stage. Significantly
more U235 enrichment can be obtained from a singleunit gas centrifuge than from a single-unit gaseous
diffusion stage.27

20. See Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Subsequent Weapons Testing, WORLD
NUCLEAR
ASSOC.,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/
Radiation-and-Health/Hiroshima,-Nagasaki,-and-Subsequent-WeaponsTesting/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
21. Uranium Enrichment, NUCLEAR REG. COMM., http://www.nrc.gov/
materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
22. See Uranium, supra note 10.
23. See What is Uranium? How Does it Work?, supra note 9.
24. Uranium Enrichment, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-andFabrication/Uranium-Enrichment/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
25. Id. (stating that “Iran has sophisticated centrifuge technology”).
26. See, e.g., Uranium Enrichment, supra note 21.
27. Id.
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B. SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty is defined as “supreme dominion, authority, or
rule” and “the supreme political authority of an independent
state.”28 Sovereignty may also be described as:
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by
which an independent state is governed and from which
all specific political powers are derived; the intentional
independence of a state, combined with the right and
power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign
interference. Sovereignty is the power of a state to do
everything necessary to govern itself, such as making,
executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting
taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or
engaging in commerce with foreign nations.29
The legal definition of sovereignty is tied to the notion of a
state. “Sovereignty is the power of a state to . . . govern itself.”30
Thus, to better understand the legal definition of sovereignty,
one must observe the legal definition of ‘state.’ One definition
finds that states are “entit[ies] that ha[ve] a defined territory
and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of
[their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities.”31
The combination of the definitions of state and sovereignty
must conclude the definition of sovereign state:
A sovereign state refers to a state that possesses full
sovereignty over its affairs, existence, and territory. It is
complete in itself. A sovereign state is recognized as
being legitimate nation by the other major nations in the
world. Major characteristics of a sovereign state are:
a. a defined territory on which the state exercises
28. Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 665 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
29. Sovereignty,
FREE
DICTIONARY,
http://legal-dictionary.thefree
dictionary.com/sovereignty (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)
(alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860
F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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internal and external sovereignty;
b. a permanent population;
c. a government, not under the control of a foreign power;
d. independence from other states and powers; and
e. the capacity to enter into relations with other
sovereign states.32

Consistent with this definition, international scholars
generally agree that four conditions comprise a sovereign state:
(1) a defined territory; (2) permanent population; (3) an effective
government; and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with
other states.33 Effective government means that the government
is able to exercise control over its territory to the exclusion of
other entities.34
C. LIMITATIONS ON A SOVEREIGN STATE
Sovereignty is not without limitation. International legal
customs and treaties are well-recognized as binding
commitments, and may limit the behavior of sovereign states.35
Besides the well-known sources of international law, new
doctrines have appeared to impose more restrictions on a
sovereign.
For instance, the notion of sovereignty fundamentally
changed after World War II—one of “the most important
outcomes of World War II was the general acceptance of the
principle that States that act as aggressors abuse their
sovereignty, and their leaders may be accountable directly to the
international community. The establishment of this principle
marked a revolutionary change in the scope of sovereignty.”36
Similarly:
32. Sovereign State Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.
uslegal.com/s/sovereign-state/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
33. See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2d ed.
2012).
34. Id. at 35.
35. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (explaining that the International Court of
Justice may consider international custom to be evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and that this body may use such international custom when
resolving disputes).
36. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of
Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 141, 160 (2004).
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At the end of WWII, considerable disquiet was generated
about the notion of the abuse of State sovereignty and
the scale of the horror that it generated. The most
important effort that clearly establishes limits to what
government can do is reflected in the work of the
Nuremburg Tribunal. In Nuremburg, the defense that
the defendants were merely following the orders of the
sovereign was rejected. The court stressed that behind
the veil of the sovereign are the finite human agents of
decision-making. A court of law could therefore penetrate
the veil of the State and sovereign and hold the decision
makers accountable. In historic terms, Nuremburg
established a critical repudiation of the principle of
sovereign absolutism. It, in effect, repudiated legal
theories of sovereignty that sought to shield defendants
from responsibility for mass murder.37
It is important to note, however, that according to the
principles adopted by the United Nations Charter, restrictions
upon the sovereignty of states could not be presumed.38 The
aforementioned limitation on sovereignty likely only applies
when humanitarian principles are violated.39
The next pool of arguments that advocate for limitations
gained potency in light of concerns regarding peace and security
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks.40 When a
powerful non-state actor takes refuge in a sovereign state and
the sovereign state invokes the principle of sovereignty to bar
the intervention of the targeted state, “[s]tates targeted by
terrorist acts are reluctant to accept that their responses to such
attacks are constrained by principles of sovereignty in
international law.”41
Many scholars also recognize the concept of “abuse of
sovereignty.”42 As a result, sovereignty is not a license to kill, to
make war, or threaten international peace.43 International law
recognizes sovereigns’ rights, but it also constrains obligations

37. Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and
Practice, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 429, 456 (2012).
38. Nagan & Hammer, supra note 36, at 154.
39. See id. at 160.
40. See id. at 170.
41. Id. at 170–71.
42. See, e.g., id. at 176–77.
43. Id. at 177.
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to a sovereign state.44 Although this argument might have merit
in some cases, it is hard to imagine that Iran’s uranium
enrichment program can be related to abuse of sovereignty in
this sense—i.e., to provide a safe haven for non-state terrorist
actors.
Setting aside the debatable legal doctrines for imposing
limitations on the sovereignty of a state, Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice clearly outlines the
relevant sources of international law:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to
it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.45
Article 38(1)(a) enshrines international conventions a
source of international law, with subpart 38(1)(b) supplementing
this list with customary international law. Thus, a sovereign
state is subject to international custom and the international
treaties it has signed. In effect, with every international
convention that a sovereign state accepts, its sovereignty is
likewise confined.
1. International Treaties
Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy

44. Id.
45. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
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Agency (IAEA),46 which it joined in 1958.47 Iran is also a
signatory state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT).48 Interpretation of international treaties is
often controversial, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties aims to lessen this controversy. It prescribes that
treaties shall be interpreted in good faith49 and “in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”50 The
Vienna Convention considers “[t]he context for the purpose of
the interpretation” to be comprised of the text of the treaty, the
preamble, and annexes.51 The relevant treaties for the purposes
of this Note are the Statute of IAEA and the NPT.
a. International Atomic Energy Agency
The traumatic animosities of the Second World War and the
dangers of new and powerful atomic technology pushed the
international community to recognize the need for international
collaboration through a supra-national organization that
oversees use of atomic energy. The “genesis [of the IAEA] was
President Eisenhower’s address to the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 8 December 1953.”52 These ideas helped to
shape the IAEA Statute, which eighty-one nations unanimously
approved in October 1956.53
Article III(A)(5) of the IAEA Statute authorizes it “[t]o
establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that
special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment,
facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its
request or under its supervision or control are not used in such
a way as to further any military purpose.”54 Iran and the IAEA
46. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Members of the Agency, at 1,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/2/Rev.78 (Mar. 20, 2015).
47. Id. at 1.
48. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AGENCY:
THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 1 (1997), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. III, approved
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signed an agreement for the application of safeguards in
connection with the NPT which came into force on May 15,
1974.55
Article 4 of this Safeguards Agreement specified the manner
in which the agreement shall be implemented.56 Two of its goals
were “[t]o avoid hampering the economic and technological
development of Iran or international co-operation in the field of
peaceful nuclear activities” and “[t]o avoid undue interference in
Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the
operation of facilities.”57 Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement
requires the IAEA to protect Iran’s commercial and industrial
secrets and other confidential information.58 Article 8 demands
that the agency ask for only the “minimum amount of
information and data” for its inspections,59 and Article 9 requires
the agency to “secure the consent of the Government of Iran to
the designation” of its inspectors.60 Article 7 provides the
necessary regulatory requirements for the IAEA to implement
its duties:
(a) The Government of Iran shall establish and maintain
a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear
material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in such a manner
as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has
been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
findings of Iran’s system. The Agency’s verification shall
include, inter alia, independent measurements and
observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with
the procedures specified in Part II of this Agreement. The
Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the

Oct. 26, 1956, 81 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute].
55. IAEA, The Text of the Agreement Between Iran and the Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974)
[hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
56. Id. art. IV.
57. Id.
58. Id. art. V.
59. Id. art. VIII.
60. Id. art. IX.
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technical effectiveness of Iran’s system.61
Article XII(C) of the IAEA Statute empowers the Board of
Governors of the IAEA to report a state’s noncompliance with
safeguards to “all members and to the Security Council and
General Assembly of the United Nations.”62 The IAEA Board, in
its 2005 resolution, found “that Iran’s many failures and
breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards
Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute
noncompliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s
Statute.”63 The IAEA Board also found that Iran’s nuclear
program raised “questions that are within the competence of the
Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security.”64
In 2006, the United Nations Security Council considered
Iran’s nuclear program for the first time65 and demanded “that
Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, to be verified by
the IAEA.”66 The Security Council cautioned Iran that it would
“adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply
with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA.”67 Article
41 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter reads:
The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.68

61. Id. art. VII.
62. See IAEA Statute, supra note 54, art. XII.C.
63. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ 1, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005) [hereinafter
Implementation Agreement 2005].
64. Id. ¶ 2.
65. See S.C. Res. 1696 (July 31, 2006).
66. Id. ¶ 2.
67. Id. ¶ 8.
68. U.N. Charter art. XXXXI.
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This provision empowers the Security Council to dictate to
member states to “call upon the Members of the United Nations
to apply such measures.”69 Since 2006, the Security Council has
imposed four sanctions regimes on Iran. These measures have
heavily restricted Iran’s banking system, investments in or by
Iran, Iranian aircraft or sea vessels, in- or out-bound cargo, and
the sale of arms, as well as directly targeting individuals whom
the Security Council considers to be key figures in Iran’s nuclear
program.70
b. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The NPT was designed to prevent the “wider dissemination
of nuclear weapons,” foster “peaceful applications of nuclear
technology,” and take “effective measures in the direction of
nuclear disarmament.”71 It does so by imposing a system of
safeguards on non-nuclear weapon state parties;72 member
states must accept “safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to
be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic
Energy Agency.”73 Administering these safeguards is the
responsibility of the IAEA,74 which monitors the nuclear
activities of NPT member states accordingly.75 Iran is a member
of the NPT76 and concluded its Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA in 1974.77
The NPT divides countries into “nuclear-weapon States”
and “non-nuclear-weapon States.”78 It then mandates that
nuclear-weapon states:
[n]ot to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
69. Id.
70. See S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 10 (Dec. 27, 2006).
71. NPT, supra note 48.
72. Id. art. III, ¶ 1.
73. Id.
74. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA, http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2015) (providing a brief overview of the NPT and the IAEA’s role in its
implementation).
75. NPT, supra note 48, art. III, ¶ 1.
76. See NPT, supra note 48.
77. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55.
78. NPT, supra note 48.
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indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.79
The NPT demands that non-nuclear-weapon states must
not receive such weapons or nuclear explosive devices, nor
control or assist in the manufacture of such weapons or nuclear
explosive devices.80
Article III of the NPT states that “[t]he safeguards required
by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering
the economic or technological development of the Parties or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear
activities.”81 Article IV of the NPT states that “[n]othing in this
Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of
all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty.”82
Article III of the NPT also mentions that the materials are
subject to the procedure for safeguards:
[P]rocedures for the safeguards required by this Article
shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced,
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is
outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this
Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried
out under its control anywhere.83
According to Article III of the NPT, the safeguards “shall be
applied on all source or special fissionable material.”84
Accordingly, centrifuges and other enrichment equipment fall
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. art. I.
Id. art. II.
Id. art. III, ¶ 3.
Id. art. IV.
Id. art. III, ¶ 1.
Id.
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out of the scope of the NPT and its safeguards.
2. Regional Treaties
In addition to the NPT, Iran is subject to various regional
treaties. In 1978, the Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab
Emirates) signed the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution85 (Kuwait Convention). This regional convention
broadly defines “marine pollution” as the “introduction by man,
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health,
hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of
quality for use of sea-water and reduction of amenities.”86 It
further asks the parties to take all appropriate measures in
accordance with the convention to prevent, abate, and combat
pollution of the marine environment.87
One of Iran’s key nuclear sites is Bushehr Nuclear Power
Plant (BNPP).88 Bushehr, the capital of Iran’s Bushehr province,
is a port city located south of Iran along the northern coast of the
Persian Gulf.89 “German firms started building the Bushehr
plant in 1975, but work was halted in 1979 following the Iranian
Revolution. In 1995, Iran and Russia signed a contract to finish
the plant, although financial, technical and political problems
led to further delays.”90 According to the IAEA’s report on
October 30, 2013, BNPP was operating at maximum nominal
power in October 2013.91 Countries along the Persian Gulf have
85. Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Pollution, July 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133
[hereinafter Kuwait Convention].
86. Id. art. I, ¶ (a).
87. Id. art. III, ¶ (a).
88. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/facilities/184/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
89. Bushehr, IRAN AIR, http://www.iranair.com/portal/Home (follow “Travel
Information: Destinations” hyperlink; then follow “Domestic” hyperlink; then
click “Bushehr”) (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
90. Rehab Abd Almohsen, Earthquake Concerns over Iranian Nuclear Plan,
SCIDEV (June 17, 2013), http://www.scidev.net/global/nuclear/news/earthquake
-concerns-over-iranian-nuclear-plant.html.
91. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 13,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/56 (Nov. 13, 2013).
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raised their concerns regarding the safety of BNPP. During a
closed-door meeting of the Board of Governors of IAEA from
June 3–7, 2013, both United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia
voiced safety concerns.92 They were concerned due to their
geographical proximity to BNPP, which is closer to five Arab
Persian Gulf capitals than it is to Iran’s capital of Tehran.93
In accordance with the Kuwait Convention, the Persian Gulf
states signed the Protocol for the Protection of the Marine
Environment Against Pollution from Land Based Sources (the
Protocol) in 1990.94 This Protocol applies to discharges from
land-based sources within the territories of the parties.95 It
requires the Persian Gulf countries to develop and implement
source control programs.96
3. Customary International Law
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law defines
customary international law as law that “results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation.”97 Based on this definition, customary
international law exists when two key requirements are met:
“(1) a relatively uniform and consistent state practice regarding
a particular matter; and (2) a belief among states that such
practice is legally compelled.”98 The uniformity and consistency
of the practice must be evident over some extended period of
time.99 In addition, international law “rests upon principles of
sovereignty and consent.”100 Generally, international law is
comprised of rules that states have accepted via a treaty or

92. Iran’s Gulf Arab Neighbors Worried About Bushehr Reactor, AL
ARABIYA NEWS (June 6, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middleeast/2013/06/06/Iran-s-Gulf-Arab-neighbors-worried-about-Bushehrreactor.html.
93. Id.
94. Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against
Pollution From Land-Based Sources, Feb. 21, 1990, http://www2.unitar.org/
cwm/publications/cbl/synergy/pdf/cat3/UNEP_regional_seas/convention_kuwai
t/Protocols/protocol_prot_marine_env_against.pdf [hereinafter Protocol].
95. Id. art. III.
96. Id. art. IV, ¶ 1.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102.2 (1987).
98. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 93.
99. Id.
100. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
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otherwise.101 Thus, states must have regarded their practice
over an extended period of time as the law, if it is a binding
international custom.102
Customary international law plays an important role when
no treaty has been developed to govern a particular topic, when
certain states are not parties, or when treaties are inadequate.103
For example, when dealing with environmental concerns
regarding nuclear activities, customary international law may
apply limitations on a sovereign with respect to environmental
concerns.104
Another source of environmental international law is the
majority
consensus
of
non-binding
resolutions
and
recommendations of international organizations.105 Some of the
international environmental law principles, derived from nonbinding resolutions and recommendations of international
organizations, have not been practiced uniformly or consistently
for a long enough period of time to be considered customary
international law.106 However, despite questions regarding the
strength and authority of current international environmental
principles, such principles are not completely void of legal
importance.107
These principles, “which are neither strictly binding nor
completely void of any legal significance,’ but which in time may
harden into customary international law,” are referred to as a
form of ‘soft’ international law.108 “Soft law is a legal
phenomenon in international law which refers to the nonbinding international agreements or norms which have altered
the process by which international law has developed over the
past decade.”109 Two examples of international environmental
law principles include the precautionary principles and the

101. Id.
102. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 93–95.
103. MURPHY, supra note 3333, at 92.
104. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938)
(holding the Canadian government must remedy harms caused to the state of
Washington by transboundary air pollution from the operation of a smelting
company in British Columbia).
105. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 51–53 (4th
ed. 2003)
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Jeffrey M. Pollock & Jonathan S. Jemison, The Emerging of
International Environmental Law, N.J. LAW, Feb. 1999, at 25–28.
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polluter pays principle.
The precautionary principle states not to postpone costeffective measures to prevent potential environmental harm,
where there is lack of scientific certainty of such harm but the
potential damage is serious and irreversible.110 This concept is
embodied in the fifteenth principle of the Rio Declaration,
stating “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”111
The polluter pays principle provides that the polluting state
must pay the cost of remedying the harm caused by its
pollution.112 As provided in principle sixteen of the Rio
Declaration, “national authorities should endeavor to promote
the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due
regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment.”113
III. IRAN’S RIGHT TO ENRICH URANIUM
The Islamic Republic of Iran has effective control over a
territory of 1,648,195 square kilometers.114 In this respect, it is
the eighteenth largest territory in the world.115 As of July 2014,
its population was 80,840,713.116 Iran—a recognized
independent international state and United Nations
member117—has ratified many international accords and
treaties. In addition, Iran joined the IAEA in 1958118 and is also
110. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 426.
111. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.
I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
112. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 427.
113. Rio Declaration, supra note 111, princ. 16.
114. See The World Fact Book: Iran, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Member States of the United Nations, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/
members/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
118. See IAEA, supra note 46.
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a signatory state of the NPT.119
These facts emphasize that Iran fulfills all four
requirements that international law requires as a sovereign
state—defined territory, permanent population, effective
government, and capacity to enter into relations with other
states.120 Iran’s sovereignty is not in question—the question is
whether Iran, as a sovereign state, has a right to enrich uranium
within its territory.
This issue can be analyzed in two ways. First, whether Iran
has the positive right to enrich uranium; and second, whether
Iran is prohibited from enriching uranium. The key difference is
in the presumption that each question embodies. The first
question assumes that Iran needs permission to conduct internal
affairs. The second question, however, presumes that Iran is
inherently free to conduct an activity unless it is prohibited from
doing so. Thus, the answer for the second question lies in
whether Iran is prohibited from enriching uranium.
The International Court of Justice—in response to being
asked by the U.N. General Assembly whether “the threat or use
of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under
international law,”121—stated that the first viewpoint:
[w]as incompatible with the very basis of international
law, which rests upon the principles of sovereignty and
consent; accordingly; and contrary to what is implied by
use of the word ‘permitted,’ states are free to threaten or
use nuclear weapons unless it can be shown that they are
bound not to do so by reference to a prohibition in either
treaty law or customary international law.122
This opinion emphasizes that “[i]nternational law rests on
the principle of the sovereignty of states.”123 Restriction upon
independent states cannot be presumed,124 and “international
law leaves to States ‘a wide measure of discretion which is only

119. NPT, supra note 48.
120. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 34.
121. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 238 (July 8).
122. Id.
123. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 13 (citation omitted).
124. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 238,
¶ 21 (citing The Case of the Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7, 1927)).
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limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.’”125
An advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
suggests that Iran, as a sovereign state, is free to enrich uranium
unless a prohibition of such an activity is shown under
international law.126 Thus, Iran’s right to enrich uranium is
presumed unless proven otherwise. The following is a discussion
of possible prohibitions that international treaties might impose
on Iran’s enrichment rights.
A. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
As a member of the IAEA and a signatory of the NPT, Iran
must act within the limits imposed by these commitments.127
Following Iran’s commitment under Article III of the NPT,128 a
Safeguards Agreement was negotiated with the IAEA and
implemented in 1974.129 According to Article II of the NPT, Iran,
as a non-nuclear party:
[u]ndertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.130
Thus, Iran is bound not to manufacture nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. Article II of the NPT certainly
constitutes a limitation on Iran’s nuclear program.
Enriching uranium is the starting point for facilitating the
use of nuclear energy, however.131 This energy is employed in
atomic weapons and power plants.132 Although the enrichment
process is a necessary step in the manufacture of nuclear energy,
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 26.
128. NPT, supra note 48, at art. III, ¶ 1.
129. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55.
130. NPT, supra note 48, at art. II.
131. See What is Uranium?, supra note 9.
132. See id.
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it does not have to correlate with manufacturing nuclear
weapons.133 For example, Germany—a member of the NPT—
engages in uranium enrichment,134 and yet is still classified as
non-nuclear by the NPT.135
Article IV of the NPT declares that “[n]othing in this Treaty
shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and
in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”136 According
to the Vienna Convention, interpretation of a treaty should be
contextual, and should include the preamble of the treaty.137 The
NPT’s preamble states that parties express their support for
“development and other efforts to further the application, within
the framework of the IAEA safeguards system”138 and affirms
that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology,
including any technological by-products which may be derived
from development of nuclear explosive devices, should be
available for peaceful purposes to all NPT parties.139
Considering the preamble and language of the treaty, even
if Article IV does not embody the right of a party to enrich
uranium for peaceful purposes, there is certainly no positive
prohibition.
Under Article IV of the NPT, all countries have a right to
civilian nuclear programs as long as they do not attempt
to produce weapons programs. Given such, a complete
ban on the sale or spread of nuclear enrichment and
processing materials is simply not a viable legal
possibility . . . there is no means for a complete ban on
the proliferation of nuclear technologies or dual-use [both
peaceful and non-peaceful] technologies.140
In a multitude of reports and resolutions issued by the
133. See id.
134. Nuclear Power in Germany, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOC., http://www.
world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany/ (last updated
Oct. 4, 2015).
135. Id.
136. NPT, supra note 48, art. IV, ¶ 1.
137. Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 31, ¶ 2.
138. NPT, supra note 48.
139. Id.
140. Kyle Mathis, The Nuclear Supplier Group: Problems and Solutions, 4
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 169, 184 (2013).
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Director General and Board of Governors of the IAEA, this
agency accused Iran of failing to meet its obligations under the
Safeguards Agreement.141 These allegations began in 2003,
noting that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement”142 and continued in the September 24,
2005 resolution of the Board of Governors, in which it found that
Iran’s failures constituted direct non-compliance with the NPT
Safeguards Agreement.143 This resolution further found that
Iran’s nuclear program raised “questions that are within the
competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the
main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security.”144 Among others, the IAEA has also accused Iran
of non-collaboration, failure to report,145 and a lack of candor in
its communications.146
Iran has accused the IAEA of “poorly safeguarding
inspection data and thus tacitly colluding with foreign
intelligence agencies.”147 According to Article V of the
Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA must protect Iran’s
commercial and industrial secrets as well as other confidential
information.148 Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, the former head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), once said:
[w]e do not say that international inspectors are spies,
we do not say that the agency is connected to terrorists
and saboteurs . . . what we are saying is that they do not
keep data secure. Information on Iran is stored on sites
that can be infiltrated by hackers in the West . . . .can it
not be seen how our scientists are assassinated and our

141. See, e.g., IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 7, ¶ 32, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6, 2003)
[hereinafter Implementation Agreement: June 2003]; Implementation
Agreement 2005, supra note 63, at 2, ¶ 1.
142. Implementation Agreement: June 2003, supra note 141, at 7.
143. Implementation Agreement 2005, supra note 63, at 2, ¶ 1.
144. Id. at 2, ¶ 2.
145. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶¶ 25, 46, 48, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Implementation Agreement: Nov. 2003].
146. Id. ¶¶ 23, 32.
147. See Steven Ditto, Iranian Suspicions about the IAEA, WASHINGTON
INST. (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/iranian-suspicions-about-the-iaea.
148. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55, art. 5, ¶ (a).
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[nuclear] sites are sabotaged?149

The assassination and cyber-attacks that Iranian officials
refer to are serious and real dangers. Iran has suffered cyberattacks to its nuclear sites which may constitute “an [illegal] act
of force.”150 At least five Iranian nuclear scientists have been
murdered, most of them by bombs planted on their cars.151
Iranian and international media have blamed these terrorist
and cyber-attacks on Israel and the United States.152
The other concern regarding the safeguards agreement is its
authority and realm of application. Although the IAEA has
asked for Iranian cooperation “in order to restore international
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme,”153 Iran views many of the IAEA’s requests as
falling outside the scope of the requirements outlined by the
safeguard agreements.154
The safeguards agreement has limited applications.
According to Article III of the NPT, the safeguards apply only to
“source or special fissionable material” and “all source or special
fissionable material.”155 Article IV of the Safeguards Agreement
provides that these must be implemented in a way “[t]o avoid
hampering the economic and technological development of Iran
or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear
149. Ditto, supra note 147.
150. “The 2009 cyberattack by the U.S. and Israel that crippled Iran’s
nuclear program by sabotaging industrial equipment constituted ‘an act of force’
and was likely illegal under international law, according to a manual
commissioned by NATO’s cyber defense center in Estonia.” See Shaun
Waterman, U.S.-Israeli Cyberattack on Iran was ‘Act of Force,’ NATO Study
Found, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2013/mar/24/us-israeli-cyberattack-on-iran-was-act-of-forcena/?page=all.
151. “Although Israel has never acknowledged it, the country’s famed
espionage agency—the Mossad—ran an assassination campaign for several
years aimed at Iran’s top nuclear scientists.” See Dan Raviv, U.S. Pushing Israel
to Stop Assassinating Iranian Nuclear Scientists, CBS NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-pushing-israel-to-stop-assassinatingiranian-nuclear-scientists/.
152. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
153. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant
provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 5,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/27 (May 22, 2013).
154. IAEA, Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the
Implementation of Safeguards in Iran, Special Remarks, Comment, ¶ 4, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/786 (Mar. 2, 2010).
155. NPT, supra note 48, art. III, ¶ 2.
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activities,” and “[t]o avoid undue interference in Iran’s peaceful
nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of
facilities.”156 Article V also requires the IAEA to protect Iran’s
commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential
information.157 Similarly, Article VIII demands that the IAEA
shall ask for only the “minimum” amount of information and
data on its inspections.158
According to Iran, despite these restrictions, the IAEA
requests information that goes beyond the agreements. Iran has
sometimes cooperated with such requests, but it has never
regarded such cooperation as an obligation.159
Having considered that the Safeguards Agreement
between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran is
governing the relation between the Agency and Iran it
constitutes the legal basis for cooperation and the
Agency’s requests should be based on that agreement.
Thus, it is not clear why the Agency’s requests go[]
beyond the Safeguards Agreement and even beyond the
Additional Protocol, although the latter is not being
implemented by Iran.160
Notwithstanding the objections that both parties had in
regards to the implementation of the safeguard agreements, a
September 2005 IAEA resolution found “that Iran’s many
failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75,
constitute[ed] non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute.”161 Further, on February 4, 2006, another
IAEA resolution requested that the Director General report to
the Security Council that the Board had asked Iran to respond

156. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55, art. 4, at 2.
157. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55, art. 5, at 2.
158. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 55, art. 8, at 3.
159. “Accordingly, the Agency’s request to take DA samples from the heavy
water stored at UCF has no justification referred to Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement (INFCIRC/214). However, the Agency inspectors were allowed to
perform their attribute test in order to confirm that they are not nuclear
materials.” See IAEA, Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the
Implementation of Safeguards in Iran, Special Remarks, Comment, ¶ 5, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/786 (Mar. 2, 2010).
160. Id. ¶ 4.
161. Implementation Agreement 2005, supra note 63, ¶ 1.
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to outstanding questions related to its nuclear program.162
Article XII(C), which empowers the Board of Governors of the
IAEA to announce non-compliance, is worthy of a more detailed
study. Its most relevant part reads:
The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the
Director General who shall thereupon transmit the
report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call
upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith
any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The
Board shall report the non-compliance to all members
and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the
United Nations.163
In Iran’s case however, no report found Iran in
noncompliance. Nevertheless, the Board of Governors,
independently, found that “Iran’s many failures and breaches of
its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreements,
as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitutes non-compliance in the
context of Article XII(C) of the Agency’s Statute.”164
The Board of Governors’ independent assessment, in which
it found that Iran was non-compliant, is an extension of the
Board’s authority and has no clear basis in the Statute of the
IAEA. This fact fundamentally undermines the legality of
finding Iran in noncompliance and consequently conveying these
findings to the Security Council. Before finding non-compliance,
one of the Board of Governors’ resolutions stated that “all the
declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and
that such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”165
However, in a prior resolution, the Board noted, “the Agency is
not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran.”166 Basically, there was
no affirmative evidence of deviation to nuclear weapon
manufacturing on the Iranian side. Instead, the issue was lack
of certainty in the viewpoint of the IAEA concerning possible
undeclared activity or material in Iran. That did not rise to the

162. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
163. IAEA Statute, supra note 54, art. XII.C.
164. Implementation Agreement 2005, supra note 63, ¶ 1.
165. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ (d), IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/90 (Sept. 29, 2004).
166. Id.
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level of non-compliance, but yet the Board of Governors
enthusiastically found Iran to be non-compliant—with no clear
authority to do so.
While “[r]ecognizing the basic and inalienable right of all
Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful
purpose,”167 the IAEA repetitively asked Iran “to suspend all
further uranium enrichment-related activities.”168 The language
of the resolutions of the IAEA has slightly changed regarding the
extent of suspension and right of states to nuclear energy in the
course of time. However, in its essence, it always recognized the
right of the member states to develop peaceful nuclear energy
with due consideration for needs of developing countries and
within the boundaries of NPT.169 Iran did suspend all
enrichment related and reprocessing activities in a voluntary,
confidence-building measure170 from 2003–05. Since then, Iran
has disregarded this request.171
There is no need to study the legal basis of the question
“whether the IAEA has the legal authority to prohibit Iran from
enriching uranium,” because it has never took such a position.
Rather, it merely requested a suspension of enriching uranium
until it can verify Iran’s intention for its nuclear activities.
However, as noted supra, the IAEA conveyed Iran’s nuclear
issue to the United Nations Security Council.172 The Security
Council, in its resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program,
then took the same position as the IAEA.173 It affirmed “that
Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which
are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful
167. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ (k), IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/69 (Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter
Implementation Agreement: Sept. 2003].
168. Id. ¶ 3.
169. Compare Implementation Agreement: Sept. 2003, supra note 167, ¶ (k),
with IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ (o), IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/81 (Nov. 26, 2003), and IAEA,
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, ¶ 7, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/49 (June 18, 2004), and IAEA, Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ (d), ¶ 3,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/79 (Sept. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Implementation
Agreement: Sept. 2004].
170. Implementation Agreement: Sept. 2004, supra note 169, ¶ 3.
171. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ¶ 4, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
172. Implementation Agreement 2005, supra note 63, ¶ 2.
173. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 65, ¶ 1.
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purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding
questions.”174
Consequently, the Security Council demanded that Iran
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development.175 It further expressed “its
intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied
with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under
Article 41 if Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the
requirements of the IAEA.”176 Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
Charter empowers the Security Council to dictate to the member
states.177 Iran did not comply with the resolution and since 2006,
the Security Council has imposed six resolutions on Iran. These
resolutions enforce heavy sanctions against Iran’s banking
system, ships, investments, cargoes, and arms sales, as well as
travel restrictions against individuals whom the Security
Council considers to be key figures in Iran’s nuclear program.178
Legally, can the Security Council demand that Iran
suspend “enrichment-related and reprocessing activities” or
impose sanctions on Iran? Both are grounded in its authority
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The issue is that
none of the reports or resolutions of the IAEA consider Iran’s
nuclear program as a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
and acts of aggression,” while Chapter VII defines the Security
Council’s authority to act only in response to threats of this
kind.179 However, the Security Council has never characterized
Iran or its nuclear program a “threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, and acts of aggression.”180
The closest that any Security Council statement comes to
this standard is a July 2006 resolution that reminded the world
that it is “concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the
Iranian nuclear programme, mindful of its primary
responsibility under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and []
determined to prevent an aggravation of the situation.”181
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 8.
U.N. Charter art. 41.
S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 10.
U.N. Charter ch. VII.
S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 10; see U.N. Charter art. 39–41.
S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 65, at 2, ¶ 3.
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According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council
takes action under the authority that is vested in the Security
Council from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, after
determining the existence of a serious threat to peace exists.182
For example, in the resolution authorizing the Korean police
action in 1950, the Security Council noted “the armed attack on
the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,”183 and then
determined that this action “constitutes breach of the peace.”184
In 1965, with regards to Southern Rhodesia, the Security
Council clearly determined “that the situation resulting from
proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in
Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave . . . and that its
continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace
and security.”185 In the more recent case of the Persian Gulf War
of 1990–91, the Security Council, in Resolution 660, determined
“that there exists a breach of international peace and security as
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.”186 Within the time period
that the Security Council was adopting resolutions against Iran,
Resolution 1907 determined that “Eritrea’s actions undermining
peace and reconciliation in Somalia as well as the dispute
between Djibouti and Eritrea constitute a threat to international
peace and security.”187 There is no such determination with
respect to Iran in any resolutions of the Security Council, and
sanctioning a country without such a finding is contrary to the
practice of the Security Council.
There are also serious legal questions regarding the
authority of the Security Council and whether it has plenary
authority over international affairs. Even if one assumes that
the Security Council had the authority to decide Iran’s right to
enrich uranium, and its actions under the authority of Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter had any legal basis, Iran’s
right to enrich uranium as a sovereign state, may nonetheless
not be affected. Despite prior resolutions, the Security Council
never prohibited Iran from enrichment. It merely demanded
suspension of enrichment until Iran’s nuclear program “be
verified by the IAEA.”188
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

U.N. Charter art. 39.
S.C. Res. 82, ¶ 1 (June 25, 1950).
Id.
S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 1965).
S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990).
S.C. Res. 1907 (Dec. 23, 2009).
S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 65, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006).
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In short, according to the IAEA, Iran did not meet its
obligations under the Safeguards Agreement that it had
negotiated with the IAEA under the NPT. The IAEA then,
according to its vested treaty authority (with serious legal
questions regarding statutory compliance) conveyed Iran’s
nuclear issue to the Security Council. The Security Council—
again with serious legal questions surrounding the basis for
action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and after
demanding Iran suspend all “enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities”—sanctioned Iran only to persuade it to
cooperate with the international community. Nothing in this
chain of events suggests that Iran is prohibited from enriching
uranium. As a result, Iran is merely requested to suspend its
enrichment program for verification under international law.189
The following summarizes Iran’s nuclear obligations: “[The
Security Council,] [d]emands, in this context, that Iran shall
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development, to be verified by the
IAEA.”190 If the Security Council’s resolutions were worded in a
different manner, then Iran might not have the right to enrich
uranium. However, this is not the case. Iran’s alleged violations
of the safeguard agreements have merely resulted in heavy
economic sanctions and requests for conditional suspension of
uranium-related reprocessing activities. Security Council
resolutions therefore have not affected Iran’s enrichment rights.
International law is based on the principles of sovereignty of
states and their consent.191 International law gives nearuniversal discretion to sovereign states,192 unless otherwise
prohibited by regional treaties or customary international law.
Since no textual provision of a treaty or Security Council action
has specifically stated that Iran retains no enrichment
authority, it undoubtedly retains the right to do so today.
B. REGIONAL TREATIES
Regional treaties have the same authority as international
treaties. In fact, regional treaties are a special form of
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international treaties.193 Iran and other Persian Gulf countries
of the region are subject to the regional treaties they have
signed—namely the Kuwait Convention and its associated
protocols.
Persian Gulf countries have expressed concern regarding
Iran’s nuclear program, especially regarding the BNPP. In June
2013, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia raised safety
concerns during a closed-door meeting with the Board of
Governors of IAEA.194 The Bushehr plant is closer to five
Arabian state capitals in the Persian Gulf region than it is to
Tehran.195 These concerns were escalated after an earthquake
took place in that region in April 2013.196 “Following the quake,
the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council [P]GCC called on the
IAEA to send a specialized technical team to inspect the Bushehr
nuclear plant and investigate potential damage.”197 Persian Gulf
countries are also concerned about possible future earthquakes
and tsunamis.198 In reference to the demand, the former head of
the AEOI stated that “[t]he request of these countries is a
political gesture and propaganda. IAEA inspectors are present
in Iran and monitor Iran’s nuclear activities.”199 Abbasi also
remarked that the IAEA has not reported any deviation from
safety standards in BNPP.200 The IAEA has also not publicly
acknowledged that “[t]he [BNPP] reactor is designed to
withstand a magnitude 8 earthquake and to automatically shut
down if there is a major earth movement.”201
This analysis does not take the potential political issues of
Persian Gulf countries into account and assumes that they have
genuine concerns regarding the safety of Iran’s nuclear program.
The legal aspects of such concerns are presented in treaties and
customary international law discussed infra.
Iran is not a signatory to any regional treaty that
specifically discusses nuclear programs. Admittedly, Iran and
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other Persian Gulf countries are subject to the Kuwait Regional
Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution.202 However, the Kuwait
Convention and its protocols are concerned about pollution of the
sea area and do not specifically address nuclear pollution.203
Additionally, no uranium enrichment site is located in the areas
where Persian Gulf states are focused. The BNPP site also is a
power plant, not a uranium enrichment facility. Thus, even if
one assumes that Iran must halt its nuclear activities in areas
close to other Persian Gulf states due to safety reasons, this
assumption merely means Iran must shut down sites in such
geographical areas, not sites in other locations—Natanz for
example—which is located in the center of Iran204 and is the
main site for enriching uranium.205 Such safety concerns do not
affect the substance of Iran’s enrichment rights. These are
merely safety issues that if valid, should be addressed in a
limited manner.
Even if Iran decides to enrich uranium in areas such as the
BNPP, it would not be prohibited since the Kuwait Convention
broadly defines pollution.206 The Kuwait Convention does
require Persian Gulf states to prevent pollution of the sea area,
but it does not constrain nuclear activities close to the sea. The
Protocol is mainly concerned about discharges from land-based
sources207 and it requires the states to develop and implement
source control programs.208
Nuclear sites may be within the category of “land-based
sources” within the definition of the Protocol if any discharge
reaches the marine environment.209 Iran is bound by the
Protocol to develop and implement source control programs for
BNPP if it affects the sea.210 However, as long as Iran maintains
the safety requirements that the Protocol asks for, the Kuwait
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204. Natanz
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Convention and any associated protocol should not prohibit Iran
from enriching uranium.
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOFT LAW
In an advisory opinion regarding the legality of using
nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice considered
all international treaties, international environmental law,
humanitarian law, and customary international law, finding no
basis that the use of nuclear weapons was prohibited.211 If the
use of nuclear weapons is not prohibited by customary
international law and if sovereign states have not adopted an
international custom to prohibit use for an extended period of
time, then a state has most certainly not consented to any
prohibitions on uranium enrichment. The fact that there are
ninety-nine licenses for nuclear power plants in the United
States and that 20% of its electricity212 and 17% of Germany’s
electricity213 is produced in nuclear power plants is powerful
evidence that current state practice does not suggest a blanket
prohibition on uranium enrichment.
The International Court of Justice studied the potential
environmental issues related to use of a nuclear weapon and
held that:
[w]hile existing international law relating to the
protection and safeguarding of the environment does not
specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it
indicates important environmental factors that are
properly to be taken into account in the context of the
implementation of the principles and rules of the law
applicable in armed conflict.214
This reasoning applies even more forcefully to peaceful
nuclear programs and uranium enrichment, which are easier to
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control.
Customary international environmental law provides a
remedy for countries that are harmed as a result of activities in
the territories of other countries.215 This requires Iran to remedy
any possible environmental harm its enrichment program may
have on other countries, but it does not prohibit Iran from
enriching uranium. Enjoining a particular industry or site
within the territory of a sovereign state that causes harm to the
territory of another state is possible in the framework of
customary international law. However, in very limited cases, it
is cognizable when there are serious consequences to an injured
state proven by clear and convincing evidence.216
Environmental law principles and customary law encourage
countries to bear the cost of environmental harms they may
cause.217 They also require a sovereign state to prevent
environmental degradation.218 Even “lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”219
Iran is subject to international environmental law and may
honor its non-binding principles, but international
environmental law does not specifically prohibit Iran’s uranium
enrichment program in the midst of a lack of harm. Since an
injury has not been proven in Iran’s case, enjoining Iran’s
nuclear program is not currently an option.
IV. CONCLUSION
The principle of sovereign equality, which is embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations,220 suggests Iran has the same
rights and responsibilities of other sovereign states of the world.
As a sovereign state, Iran and all countries of the international
community are free to exercise sovereignty over their own
territory. As a result, limitations on sovereign states are not
215. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938)
(holding that international boundaries between nations are subject to limits of
environmentally permissible conduct and that nations must not perpetrate
significant harm to other nations through pollution).
216. Id. at 1965.
217. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I),
annex I (June 3–14, 1992).
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presumed221—they must be proven. Neither treaties nor
customary international law currently prohibits Iran from
enriching uranium.
The right to enrich uranium is not a special right belonging
to select countries. Sovereign states have not consented to
discrimination over their ability to develop peaceful nuclear
technology. All signatory states of the NPT and members of the
IAEA have the right to enrich uranium unless bound by another
treaty. Non-recognition of this right is a political question, not a
legal one, and must be treated as such.
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